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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
CUYAHOGA COUNTY, OHIO 
STATE OF OHIO, 
Plaintiff, 
-vs-
SAMUEL SHEPPARD, 
Defendant. 
CASE NO. CR 64571 
JUDGE RONALD SUSTER 
MOTION OF THE STATE OF OHIO FOR 
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
The State of Ohio, by and through counsel, Stephanie Tubbs 
Jones, Prosecuting Attorney for Cuyahoga County, and Assistant 
Prosecuting Attorneys, Marilyn Barkley Cassidy and Patrick J. 
Murphy, hereby moves this honorable court for judgment on the 
pleadings pursuant· to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) . The grounds for this 
motion are that the State of Ohio is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law as is set forth more fully in the brief attached 
hereto and expressly incorporated herein by reference. 
Respecffully Submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, Prosecuting 
Attorney of Cuyahoga County, Ohio 
kley Cassid 
Murphy (000 01) 
Assist Prosecuting Attorneys 
1200 Ontario Street - 8th Floor 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 
INTRODUCTION 
Alan J. Davis, Speciai Administrator of the Estate of Samuel 
Sheppard, through counsel, has requested the Cuyahoga County Court 
of Common Pleas, by way of petition, to make a determination that 
the late Samuel Sheppard was a wrongfully incarcerated individual 
pursuant to R.C. §2305.02 and §2743.48. The State of Ohio asserts 
that, pursuant to Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C ) the court should enter 
judgment as a matter of law on behalf of the state. The State of 
Ohio is entitled to judgment as a matter of law by operation of the 
doctrine of laches, and the applicable statutes of limitation. 
Additionally, a claim of wrongful incarceration is a personal claim 
which an estate has no standing to pursue. Finally, any claim 
which may have been lawfully asserted by Samuel Sheppard has abated 
with his death, the passage of time, and his failure to pursue the 
claim at or near the time of his acquittal. 
FACTS 
Dr. Samuel Sheppard was indicted for murder in the first 
degree on August 17, 1954, in connection with the death of his 
wife, Marilyn Sheppard. (Petition Paragraph 1) His trial ended 
with a verdict of guilty of murder in the second degree on December 
21, 1954, and on January 3, 1955 he was sentenced to life 
imprisonment. (Petition, paragraph 2). After a lengthy appeals 
process, the United States Supreme Court in 1964, reversed the 
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conviction and ordered a new trial based on the unfairness of the 
trial and the prejudicial role of the media. (Petition, paragraph 
3). On November 16, 1966, Dr. Sheppard was subject to a re-trial 
and found not guilty of the murder. (Petition paragraph 4). Dr. 
Sheppard was incarcerated for nearly ten years in Ohio prisons. 
(Petition, paragraph 5) . 
Dr. Sheppard died on April 6, 1970. (Petition, paragraph 6). 
The action at bar was filed by the Special Administrator to the 
Estate of Samuel Sheppard in October, 1995, nearly thirty years 
after Dr. Sheppard's acquittal . 
LAW AND ARGUMENT 
A. THE OHIO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE APPLY TO COURT 
PROCEEDINGS EXCEPT WHERE CLEARLY INAPPLICABLE PURSUANT TO 
CIVIL RULE 1: ACCORDINGLY THIS COURT LACKS JURISDICTION 
Ohio law is clear that wrongful imprisonment proceedings are 
civil in nature. See Walden v. State, (1989) 47 Ohio St. 3d 47, 
where the court determined that the General Assembly intended to 
apply the usual preponderance of the evidence standard to civil 
proceedings under R.C. 2305.02. The court also cites Schrader v. 
Equitable Life Assurance Soc. (1985), 20 Ohio St. 3d 41 in 
differentiating an acquittal in a criminal trial as a determination 
that the. state has not met its burden of proof and a finding by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the accused is innocent. 
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Civil proceedings are subject to the Ohio Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Ohio Civl Rule 1 provides: 
RULE 1. Scope of rules: applicability; construction; 
exceptions. 
{A} Applicability. These rules prescribe the procedure to 
be followed in all courts of this state in the exercise of 
civil jurisdiction at law or in equity, with the exceptions 
stated in subdivision (C) of this rule. 
{B} Construction. These rules shall be construed and applied 
to effect just results by eliminating delay, unnecessary 
expense and all other impediments to the expeditious 
ad~inistration of justice. 
{C} Exceptions. These rules, to the extent that they 
would by their nature be clearly inapplicable , shall not 
apply to procudure (1) upon appeal to review any 
judgment, order or ruling, (2) in appropriation of 
property, ( 3) in forcible entry and detainer, ( 4) in 
small claims matters under Chapter 1925, Revised Code, 
( 5) in uniform reciprocal support actios, ( 6) in the 
commitment of the mentally ill, (7) in all other special 
statutory proceedings ; provided, that where any statute 
provides for procedure by general or specific reference 
to the statutes governing procedure in civil actions such 
procedure shall be in accordance with these rules. 
Under the foregoing, the civil rules apply to actions other 
than those specified and other "special statutory proceedings". 
Even where special statutory proceedings exist, the civil rules 
apply except to the extent that they are by their nature "clearly 
inapplicable." 
With reference to wrongful incarceration proceedings pursuant 
to R.C. §2305.02 and R.C. §2743.48 the Ohio Supreme Court in Walden 
v. State, supra, noted the qualitative differences between 
criminal prosecutions and civil litigation ... : 
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"In the criminal proceeding, the burden of proof is upon the 
state ... Moreover, self incrimination, privilege and discovery 
rules are different. In the criminal proceeding, the state 
may not depose the defendant nor require the defendant to 
testify involuntarily. 
In a civil proceeding, not only is the burden of proof usually 
different, it is being placed upon the plaintiff . but 
also the rules concerning trial procedure, discovery, evidence 
and constitutional safeguards differ in important aspects." 
Hence, the Ohio Supreme Court has clearly recognized those aspects 
of wrongful imprisonment proceedings which bear civil action 
characteristics. Logically, such proceedings are subject to the 
' 
civil rules. 
OHIO CIVIL RULE 3 GOVERNS COMMENCEMENT OF AN ACTION 
Ohio Civil Rule 3 (A) provides that 11 a civil action is 
commenced by filing a complaint with the court, II 
Additionally, Rule 4 provides for issuance of a summons upon the 
filing of a complaint. Alternatively, were the court to view a 
wrongful imprisonment proceeding as a declaratory proceeding 
subject to R.C. 2721 et. seq., the Ohio Civil Rules are applicable. 
See Ohio Rule 57: "The procedure for obtaining a declara•tory 
judgment shall be in accordance with these rules. 11 11 In light 
of the wording of Rule 57, such matters as service, venue, 
discovery and trial shall be in accordance with these rules 11 • 
Staff Note, Rule 57. 
In the case before this court, no complaint or petition has 
been filed with the clerk of courts, civil division. No summons 
has issued. Clearly, the requisite elements for a civil action 
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which involves motion practice, discovery, and potentially a civil 
trial have not been implemented. Accordingly, this court lacks 
jurisdiction. 
B. JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS IS BOTH PROPER AND PERMISSIBLE 
Ohio Civil Rule 12 (C) provides: 
"After the pleadings are closed but within such time as not 
to delay trial, any party may move for judgment on the 
pleadings". 
It is well established in Ohio that after reviewing pleadings, 
where a court finds that there exist no material issues of fact and 
the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, the 
moving party's motion for judgment on the pleadings should be 
granted. McComb v. Suburban Natural Gas Co. (1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 
397. 
Determination of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is 
restricted solely to allegations in the pleadings, and all material 
allegations in the complaint, with all reasonable inferences to be 
drawn therefrom are to be construed in favor of the non-moving 
party. Flanagan v. Williams, (1993) 87 Ohio App.3d 768. Moreover, 
consideration of a motion for judgment on the pleadings is squarely 
within the discretion of the court. "Whether the motion 
constitutes a delay of trial is within the discretion of the court; 
however, if it seems clear that the motion may effectively dispose 
of the case, the court should permit it regardless of any delay its 
consideration may cause." Fischer v. Morales, 38 Ohio App. 3d 110 
(1987). 
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Judgment on the pleadings is the appropriate, expeditious 
outcome for the case at bar. The operative facts as stated are 
undisputed. As will be shown below in greater depth, the State of 
Ohio is materially prejudiced by having to defend a claim some 
thirty years after it accrued. Additionally, the legislative 
history relevant to R.C. §2743.48 together with its specific 
language demonstrate that the intent of the legislature was and 
continues to be compensation of individuals, not their 
representatives, heirs and assigns. 
Finally, the Sheppard estate advances a so-called "new" theory 
of the crime as a part of its petition. Even assuming those 
conclusory theories to be true for the purpose of ruling upon this 
motion under Civil Rule 12 (C), those facts have no relevance to 
the issue at bar in light of the doctrines of laches and standing 
which have been raised by the State of Ohio. 
C. THIS ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION IS BARRED BY THE 
DOCTRINE OF LACHES 
In order to successfully prosecute a claim of laches, the 
person asserting the claim must show that he has been materially 
prejudiced by the delay of the adverse party in asserting his 
rights." Smith v. Smith, 169 Ohio St. 447, 455, 156, N.E. 2d 113, 
119 (1959) The elements of laches are: delay or lapse of time in 
asserting a right, absence of excuse for such delay, knowledge, 
actual or constructive, of injury or wrong, and prejudice to the 
other party. Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, (1984) 16 Ohio App 3d 
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399, 476 N.E. 2d 683. Delay in asserting a right does not of 
itself constitute laches and in order to successfully invoke the 
equitable doctrine of laches, it must be shown that the person for 
whose benefit the doctrine will operate has been materially 
prejudiced by the delay of person asserting his claim. Thirty Four 
Corp. v. Sixty Seven Corp, (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d 350, 474 N.E. 2d. 
299. Laches is an omission to assert a right for an unreasonable 
and unexplained length of time under circumstances prejudicial to 
the adverse party; it signifies delay independent of limitations 
in statutes, and it is lodged principally in equity jurisprudence. 
Cunnin v. Bailey (1984) 15 Ohio St. 3d. 34, 472 N.E.2d. 328. 
It is readily ascertainable from the face of the pleadings in 
the case at bar, that an overwhelmingly prejudicial lapse in time 
has occurred between the acquittal of Samuel Sheppard and the 
filing of this claim. In the intervening thirty years since the 
acquittal and the near forty two years since the crime occurred, 
events have transpired which preclude the State of Ohio from 
presenting its complete case; not the least of which is the death 
of the individual alleged to have been wrongfully incarcerated. 
(Petition, paragraph 6) . Claimant's representatives conducted 
witness interviews between the years 1990 and 1995; nearly thirty 
years after the crime, when memories have undeniably fade~. 
Moreover, prior to the enactment of R.C. §2743.48 and R.C. 
§2305.02 recourse for wrongful incarceration existed in the form of 
moral claims. Since as early as 1923, consideration was given to 
a fault in the justice system which allowed an innocent individual 
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to fall through its grips and land in a correctional institution. 
"Wrongful Incarceration In Ohio: Should There be More than A Moral 
Obligation to Compensate?" 12 Cap Univ. Law Rev 230. "Inherently 
defective convictions are usually initiated by witnesses/testimony 
and the circumstantial evidence admitted during trial. . .. the 1923 
court was accurate in its analysis of such occurrences as not being 
attributable to any fault in the law; actually, the convictions are 
due to a mixture of human perceptive errors, not legal ones. These 
errors are consequences of variables such as a witness or victim's 
reactions to the crime, the level of disturbance in the emotional 
balance of an individual in response to both physical and mental 
stress." Emphasis added. 
Generally, the faulty convictions were not acknowledged until 
the true guilty party was ascertained. Thereupon, the legislature, 
in some instances, felt a moral obligation to rectify state 
infliction of injury upon an individual. Certain requirements had 
to be met before the legislature so acted: 
"First, a cause of action against the state must not 
exist for the individual in a court of law Second 
there must be a moral obligation to make amends. A moral 
obligation is one which is not enforceable by action, 
but is binding on the party who has the obligation in 
conscience and according to natural justice. The 
obligation is viewed as a duty which would be enforceable 
if not for a rule, such as sovereign immunity, which 
exempts the party from legal liability. The extent to 
which moral obligations are to be recognized has been 
deemed to be a determination properly remaining in the 
hands of the legislature. Finally, there must be no 
dispute as to the facts of the particular case". 
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"Wrongful Incarceration in Ohio: Should there Be More Than A 
Moral Obligation to Compensate?" 12 Capital University Law Review 
265 (1982). 
Clearly Samuel Sheppard, himself, could have sought redress at 
or near the time of his acquittal through the moral claims process. 
He failed to do so. Since Sheppard's demise in 1970, only his 
estate, whose standing is questionable and will be further examined 
below, is left to initiate the claim. The petitioner has set 
forth no explanation as to why no recourse has been sought until 
now. While events which have transpired over the passage of time 
have materially prejudiced the State of Ohio, the face of the 
pleadings reveal that Samuel Sheppard is unavailable to testify at 
his own trial. Accordingly, the State's motion should be granted. 
D. THIS ACTION IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
The bulk of the Wrongful Imprisonment statute appears in 
Chapter 2743, Court of Claims. However, R.C. Section 2305.02 
provides that the court of common pleas has original jurisdiction 
over the first stage of the bifurcated proceeding. Accordingly, 
• 
the general statutes of limitation contained in R.C. Chapter 2305 
apply to such actions. 
R.C. §2305.07 
"Except as provided in sections 126.301 and 1302.98 of 
the Revised Code, an action upon a contract not in 
writing, express or implied, or upon a liability created 
by statute other than a forfeiture or penalty, shall be 
brought within six years after the cause thereof accrued. 
II 
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R.C. §2743.48 is a remedial, not a penal statute, as at least 
one court has noted, Wright v. State, 69 Ohio App. 3d 775, 591 
N.E.2d 1279 (1990): 
"For purposes of statutory construction, 'penal statute' is 
one which imposes penalty or creates forfeiture, while 
'remedial statute' is enacted to correct past defects, to 
redress existing wrong, or to promote public good . . . In this 
regard 2743.48 is a remedial statute in that it addresses an 
existing wrong. The General Assembly determined that it was 
patently wrong to deny a person compensation when the judicial 
system failed to adequately safeguard his rights, under the 
circumstances set forth in the statute ... It does not appear 
the legislature intended the remedy to penal ... " 
Wright v. State, supra, at 779. 
The proceeding at bar is a statutory one. Petitioner seeks to 
recover damages upon a liability created by statute. Absent the 
statute, no liability would exist on the part of the State .of Ohio 
by virtue of sovereign immunity. As a matter of public policy, the 
legislature could not have intended that there exist no time limit 
upon an individual's right to seek recovery for wrongful 
incarceration. As a matter of law, the six year limitation set 
forth in R.C. §2305.07 applies. The action can be said to have 
accrued , most conservatively speaking, no later than the effective 
date of the statute, September 24, 1986. As the petitioner in this 
action did not file until October 19, 1995, the commencement of the 
action falls outside the six year limitation period of §2305.07. 
R.C. §2305.09 
"Four Years; certain torts 
An action for any of the following causes shall be brought 
within four years after the cause thereof accrued; 
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(A) For trespassing upon real property; 
(B) For the recovery of personal property, or for taking or 
detaining it; 
(C) For relief on the ground of fraud; 
(D) For an injury to the rights of the plaintiff not arising 
on contract nor enumerated in sections §2305.10 to 
§2305.12, §2305.14 and §1304.34 of the Revised Code .. 
(Emphasis added) 
R.C. §2305.10 applies to Bodily injury or injury to personal 
property; §2305.11 deals with libel, slander malicious prosecution, 
false imprisonment and malpractice; R.C. §1304.34 applies to 
commercial transactions. Thus, any rights of the petitioner, 
herein, fall under section (D) of R.C. §2305.09. A liberal 
interpretation of accrual yields the date the wrongful 
incarceration statute became effective, September 24, 1986. Thus, 
assuming for the purpose of this motion that petitioner in fact has 
a claim, the statute of limitations ran in September of 1990, and 
this claim is barred. 
E. THE ESTATE OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD LACKS STANDING TO BRING A 
CLAIM FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION 
The adoption of Ohio Constitution, Art. IV Section 4, in its 
present form in 1968 made justiciability a constit~tional 
requirement, expressly adopting the view which had long been taken 
by the Ohio Supreme Court. Fortner v. Thomas (1970) 22 Ohio St. 
2d. 13 (concurring opinion of Duncan, J.). 
11 It has been long and well established that it is the 
duty of every judicial tribunal to decide actual 
controversies between parties legitimately affected by 
specific facts and to render judgments which can be 
carried into effect. It has become settled judicial 
responsibility for courts to refrain from giving opinions 
on abstract propositions and to avoid the imposition by 
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judgment of premature declarations or advice upon 
potential controversies. " Fortner v. Thomas, supra, at 
13. 
Even before the enactment of the constitutional requirement of 
justiciability, Ohio Courts had never permitted their jurisdiction 
to be invoked for the determination of abstract declarations or for 
the consideration of anything other than actual controversies 
between the actual parties litigant. For example, in Stewart v. 
Southard, 17 Ohio 402 (1848), the court held: 
"It is our duty to decide such questions only as become 
necessary to ascertain the rights of the parties 
litigant, and are legitimately presented upon the record, 
and we cannot admit that parties have the power to call 
for an opinion on a matter not thus presented, which is out 
of the case. . 11 Stewart , supra, at 406. 
The question of standing has been examined most fully in 
federal courts. As the Supreme Court stated in Valley Forge 
Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of Church and 
State, Inc. 454 U.S. 464 (1982): 
"The term 'standing' subsumes a blend of constitutional 
requirements and prudential considerations [A]t an 
irreducible minimum, Art. III requires the party who invokes 
the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered 
some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively 
illegal conduct of the defendant. ' Gladstone Real tors v. 
Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 99 (1979) , and that the 
injury 'fairly can be traced to the challenged action and is 
likely to be redressed by a favorable decision, 11 Simon v. 
Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38, 41 
(1976) In this manner does Article III limit the federal 
judicial power 'to those disputes which confine federal courts 
to a role consistent with a system of separated powers and 
which are traditionally thought to be capable of resolution 
through the judicial process.' Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 
97 (1968) 
Thus, the standing doctrine can be organized into a three-factor 
test: (1) injury in fact; (2) causation; and (3) redressability. 
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Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 3136 (1992). 
In the case at bar, factors one (injury in fact) and three 
(redressability) are not met. The individual who is alleged to 
have been wrongfully incarcerated is deceased. As is discussed 
above, there is no provision under law for an estate to seek 
recovery in a representative capacity. Moreover, as will be 
discussed in greater depth below, the statute at issue, R. C. 
§2743.48 applies only to individuals, NOT their representatives, 
heirs and assigns. Additionally, there is no allegation in the 
petition as to any injury by virtue of wrongful incarceration to 
anyone except the deceased, Samuel Sheppard. Finally, assuming 
some injury in fact did occur to Samuel Sheppard, money damages to 
the estate cannot redress those injuries. It is clear that the 
Estate of Samuel Sheppard has failed to set forth the 
constitutionally requisite case and controversy to invoke the 
jurisdiction of the court. 
RC §2743.48 CAN BE CONSTRUED ONLY TO AFFORD REDRESS TO 
WRONGFULLY INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS, NOT THEIR HEIRS, 
REPRESENTATIVES AND ASSIGNS. 
The state has waived its immunity from liability and consented to 
be sued in the Court of Claims by virtue of R.C. §2743.02 (A), 
which provides, as follows: 
"The state hereby waives its immunity from liability and 
consents to be sued, and have its liability determined, 
in the 'court of claims created in this chapter in 
accordance with the same rules of law applicable to suits 
between private parties, subject to the limitations set 
forth in this chapter." 
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The state's waiver of its sovereign immunity from liability has not 
opened up the public coffers to all who may seek recompense but, 
rather permits the liability of the state to be determined in 
accordance with the rules of law applicable to suits between 
private parties, no new claim for relief or right of action being 
created by the waiver of immunity. R.C. §2743.02 (A) merely 
permits actions against the state to be brought which were 
previously barred by the doctrine of sovereign immunity, but such 
actions must be predicated upon previously recognized claims for 
relief, for which the state would have been liable except for 
sovereign immunity. Smith v. Wait, (1975) 46 Ohio App 2d. 281 at 
283. 
The Court of Claims Act did not authorize a new claim allowing 
a civil action against the state for wrongful imprisonment. That 
action became viable only upon the adoption of R.C. §2743.48 by the 
General Assembly. R. C. §2743. 48 created duties, rights, and 
obligations of a substantive nature. Smith v. Wait, supra. 
The scope of remediation is clearly limited to the individual by 
the statutory language. 
It is a cardinal rule that the court must first look to 
language of a statute itself to determine legislative intent. 
Courts do not have authority to ignore the plain and unambiguous 
language of a statute under guise of statutory interpretation , but 
must give effect to words used; in other words, courts may not 
delete words used or insert words not used. In re Collier ( Athens 
1993) 85 Ohio App. 3d 232. In interpreting a statute words must be 
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taken in their usual, normal or customary meaning. Love v . 
Motorists Mut. Ins. Co. (Athens 1993) 86 Ohio App 3d 394. 
In Ohio, the specific inclusion by the legislature of items in a 
statute implies the exclusion of others. Kirsheman v. Paulin 
(1951) 155 Ohio St. 137, 146, Theobald v. Fugman, 64 Ohio St. 473. 
See also Investors Reit One v. Jacobs (1989) 46 Ohio ·St. 3d 176 
It is significant that the drafters of this legislation chose 
the word "individual". An individual, as defined by Random House 
Dictionary of the English Language, Second Edition, Unabridged is: 
11 1. a single human being, as distinguished from a group. 
2. a person. 
3. a distinct, indivisible entity; a single thing, 
being, instance or item. II 
The use of the word individual, as opposed to the word person, 
which has undergone extensive legal interpretation, expresses a 
clear , unambiguous intent to limit compensation to an individual. 
Further evidence of the legislature's intent to limit 
eligibility for compensation under R.C. §2743.48 can be found in 
subsection (B) (1) 
" When a court of common pleas determines, that a 
person is a wrongfully imprisoned individual, the court shall 
provide the person with a copy of this section and' orallv 
inform him and his attorney of his rights under this section. 
(Emphasis Added) 
Such language demonstrates a clear contemplation that the litigant 
himself be present. Moreover, as a matter of public policy it is 
logical that a remedy be available to those wrongfully 
incarcerated, but that state coffers NOT be opened to the families 
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of deceased individuals who decide to pursue a claim after the 
fact. Finally, had the legislature wished to include the 
representatives, heirs and assigns of wrongfully imprisoned 
indi victuals as compensable under the statute, they would have 
included specific language to so indicate. It is not within the 
authority of the court to extend clear and unambiguous language to 
areas that very language was designed to exclude. 
AN ACTION FOR WRONGFUL INCARCERATION ABATED WITH THE DEATH 
OF SAMUEL SHEPPARD 
Section §2311.21 of the Ohio Revised Code provides for abatement by 
death of a party. Specifically, the section states: 
"Unless otherwise provided, no action or proceeding 
pending in any court shall abate by the death of either 
or both of the parties thereto, except actions for libel, 
slander, malicious prosecution, for a nuisance or against 
a judge of a county court for misconduct in office, which 
shall abate by the death of either party." 
Section §2305.21, Ohio Revised Code, determines those causes which 
survive and provides: 
11 [i]n addition to the causes of action which survive at 
common law, causes of action for mesne profits, or 
injuries to the person or property, or for deceit or 
fraud, also shall survive; and such actions may be 
brought notwithstanding the death of the person entitled 
or liable thereto." 
"In order for an action to survive under R.C. §2305.21, the 
action must be one for injuries to the person and that term means 
physical injuries." Village of Oakwood v. Makar, 11 Ohio App 3d 
46, 47, (1983). At least one court has held 11 injuries to the 
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person does not encompass injuries to character or reputation: 
Flynn v. Relic, 41404 (8th District. Ohio) (June 26, 1980) 
An action for wrongful imprisonment, thus, is not an action for 
physical injuries and does not survive pursuant to R.C. §2305.21. 
Accordingly, pursuant to the "unless otherwise provided "language 
in R.C. §2311.21, the action is subject to abatement. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the foregoing facts and principles of law, the State of 
Ohio respectfully requests that the court enter judgment on its 
behalf. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
STEPHANIE TUBBS JONES, PROSECUTING 
ATTORNEY FOR CUYAHOGA COUNTY,OHIO 
arkley Cassid 
Patri Murphy (0002401) 
Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys 
1200 Ontario Street 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
(216) 443-7785 
ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF OHIO 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
A copy of the foregoing Motion for Judgment on the 
J 
Pleadings was sent by ordinary United States Mail, this ;)_j Tl, day 
of March, 1996, to Terry H. Gilbert, 1700 Standard Building, 
Cleveland, Ohio 44113. 
. CASSIDY 
t Prosecuting 
